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Israel-EU Security and Defense
Relations in the Context of the
“Arab Spring”
Les relations de défense et de sécurité entre Israël et l'Union Européenne (UE) en
vue du Printemps Arabe
Tsilla Hershco
1 The relations between Israel and the EU, since their establishment in 1959 with the EEC
(European Economic Community), are characterized as exceptionally ambiguous. In fact,
over the years Israel and the EU have established a large scale of economic, commercial,
scientific and cultural cooperation on the one hand but have developed deep political and
security disagreements on the other hand. Concurrently the EU member states and Israel
have built  up significant defense and security cooperation. However,  the defense and
security cooperation between Israel and the EU has remained rather limited. The security
and defense elations have known ups and downs. They suffered setbacks during periods
of  Israeli-Palestinian military conflicts,  such as  following the outburst  of  the Second
Intifada (2000), the Second Lebanese War (2006) or following Operation Cast Lead in the
Gaza Strip (2008).  However,  the process of  the strengthening of defense and security
cooperation has continued essentially as a result of shared strategic concerns such as the
terrorist threats and the Iranian nuclear project.1
2 The upheaval in the Arab world, which has started in 2011, added some more aspects to
the already complex Israel-EU relations. Israeli and EU’s opinions have initially diverged
over their assessment of the geostrategic ramifications of the so called Arab Spring. Thus,
while the EU has stressed the potential positive emergence of democratic regimes as a
result of the revolutionary events in the region,2 Israel has underlined the more realistic
prospects of enduring instability, at least in the short and medium terms. Concurrently
with the basic differences in their stances vis-à-vis the upheaval in the region, Israel and
the EU also share growing security concerns resulting in defense cooperation. 
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3 This article focuses on Israel-EU security and defense relations in the context of the “Arab
Spring”. It starts by presenting some major Israel-EU security and defense perceptions
and factors which have shaped Israel-EU defense and security relations before the “Arab
Spring” and examines the impact on these relations in the context of the “Arab Spring”.
It displays the divergences and convergences over issues related to the “Arab Spring”
such as  the  Israeli  Palestinian conflict,  the  Hamas,  Egypt’s  revolutionary  events,  the
Syrian Civil war, Lebanon and Hezbollah and the Iranian nuclear project. It goes on to
briefly highlight some main areas of defense and security cooperation between Israel and
the EU as well the bilateral defense cooperation between Israel and the EU member states.
It concludes with some prospects and recommendations for the future. 
 
Israel-EU Divergences and Convergences
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
4 The major factor which has shaped Israel-EU relations in general  and specifically its
security and defense cooperation relates to the substantial disagreements over the issue
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Basically, already before the “Arab Spring” the EU has
asserted that the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict consists of the creation of a
viable Palestinian state living in peace with Israel within the 1967 borders with slight
negotiated  territorial  exchanges  and  with  East  Jerusalem  as  its  capital.  The  EU  has
claimed  that  this  solution  would  guarantee  Israel’s  security.3 The  EU  has  often
emphasized its strategic high priority interest in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.  Following  the  upheaval  in  the  region  the  EU  has  accentuated  its  warnings
regarding the urgency of the resolution of the conflict, which the EU perceives as an
essential part in addressing the region’s instability. That is evident, for instance, from a
policy statement on the EU official External Action Service (EEAS): “Resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Until this is achieved, there will be
little  chance of  solving other  problems in the Middle  East”.4 The EU’s  point  of  view
regarding the urgency of the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in view of the
“Arab  awakening”  is  evident  in  the  speech  of  Catherine  Ashton,  the EU  High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in June 2012: “I have been very
clear from the beginning of the Arab awakening that developments in the region make
the peace process and a negotiated solution even more urgent and important, not less.
While we are all paying a lot of attention to the situation in Syria, Egypt and elsewhere,
ending the conflict remains a top priority and a fundamental EU interest. As for Israel the
main  source  of  concern  remains  the  repercussions  of  the  Arab  Spring  in  its  direct
neighborhood”.5
5 In addition, the EU has argued consistently before and after the “Arab Spring” that the
Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria are illegal under international law. The EU has
defined the settlements as its key concern and has often condemned Israeli decisions to
expand them stressing that they constitute an impediment to the realization of the two
states solution. Following the peace initiative of US Secretary of State John Kerry the EU
has multiplied its condemning statements, warning that the settlements could undermine
the ongoing negotiations.6
6 Israel, while declaring that it also supports the two-state solution, is skeptical regarding
the sincerity of the Palestinian Authority as well as its capacity to create a peaceful state
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alongside Israel. Thus, Israel has criticized the worrisome phenomena of anti-Israeli and
anti-Semitic incitement within the Palestinian Authority. Israel perceives the anti-Israeli
indoctrination, manifested in the Palestinian Authority textbooks, its formal media and
its worship of jihadists and terrorists, as a factor which encourages terror acts against
Israeli citizens.7
7 Israel also disagrees with the EU perception regarding the urgency of the solution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a result of the current upheaval in the region. Israel claims
that despite the importance of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, there is no linkage between
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the current instability in the Middle East, which is
caused by internal economic and political factors.8 Consequently Israel has evoked the
need to exercise prudence in view of its hostile, unstable strategic environment as well as
the tangible risk that extreme Muslim groups gain control of Arab states.9
8 Accordingly, Israel ascribes more importance to the concept that the two-state solution
should include defense guarantees such as the demilitarization of the future Palestinian
state. Additionally, Israel regards the concept of maintaining defensible borders as crucial
for preserving its capacity for self defense as well as attaining a lasting peace agreement
in the future.10
9 In this context, Israel perceives territorial continuity, especially between Maaleh Adumim
and  Jerusalem and  hence  the  building  in  the  controversial  E1  zone,  as  an  essential
security measure,  since it  connects Maaleh Adumim to Jerusalem and ensures secure
access to the strategic Jordan River Valley.11 In addition, legal reports of Israeli and non
Israeli  jurists  claim  that  the  settlements  are  compatible  with  international  law.12 A
commission, appointed by Israeli government and headed by former supreme court judge
Edmond Levy, states that the settlements are legal under international law. It criticizes,
however,  the  unauthorized  outposts.13 Furthermore,  Israel  argues  that  there  is  no
connection between the settlements and the peace agreements. Hence, the settlements
were not an obstacle for peace with Egypt or Jordan. Additionally, Israel emphasizes that
even though it has evacuated settlements in Gaza it was retaliated by rockets. Israel also
claims, in contrast to the EU, that the main obstacle to the resolution of the conflict is the
refusal of the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state and not the settlements.14
Israel has gone even further and accused the EU as being one sided in its criticism of
Israeli settlements while ignoring the unilateral steps of the Palestinian Authority such as
its appeal on April 1st, 2014 to join 15 international institutions thus breaching former
understandings.15
10 No wonder that Israel-EU relations have recently undergone some crises reflecting to a
great  extent  their  opposing  perceptions  regarding  the  settlements.  On  November-
December 2012 a significant crisis occurred on the backdrop of the UN General Assembly
vote, which granted the Palestinian Authority a non-member observer state status with
the support of most EU members. The Israeli government has subsequently authorized
the building of 3,000 houses in the E1 zone, which links Maaleh Adumim and Jerusalem.
The decision drew EU harsh criticism and some members even raised the option of
recalling their ambassadors.16
11 A more serious crisis occurred in July 2013, when the EU has published its policy
guidelines for labeling the settlements products. The guidelines included the banning of
cooperation  with  Israeli  institutions  operating  in  the  settlements.  The  proposed
guidelines also stipulated that any new agreement with Israel, such as “Horizon 2020”
which is the EU program for innovative research and development, should include Israel’s
Israel-EU Security and Defense Relations in the Context of the “Arab Spring”
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 25 | 2014
3
statements that the Jewish communities in the West Bank and the Golan Heights are not
part of Israel and therefore are not covered by the new agreements.17 Israel has rejected
the European new guidelines insisting that the EU interferes on issues which belong to
the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation table, and that Israel’s borders will not be determined
by  the  European  Commission  guidelines  but  by  negotiations  between  the  concerned
parties.18 The Israeli-EU  guidelines  crisis  was  temporarily  contained  after  the  U.S.
requested the EU to delay its decision to label products from Israeli settlements so as not
to harm US Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to revive the negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians.19 In addition both the EU and Israel have expressed their
willingness to find a solution which would enable Israel to join the Horizon 2020 program,
in accordance with the interests of both sides.20 Thus, Israel is interested in the prospects
of the lucrative investments in its scientific research and development projects while the
EU is interested in Israeli high-technology capabilities. 
 
Hamas
12 Israel’s use of force against terrorist organizations such as Hamas in Gaza, which targets
Israel’s civilian population with missiles, has repeatedly constituted a point of contention
between Israel  and the EU.  During operation Cast  Lead in winter 2008 /2009 the EU
criticized Israel even though it expressed its support for Israel’s right for self-defense. For
instance,  French president Nicolas Sarkozy,  during the French EU presidency, labeled
disproportionate the operation as soon as it started.21
13 During the period which preceded the Israeli Defense Pillar in Gaza, a period marked by
persistent  firing  of  missiles  by  Hamas,  the  EU expressed  its  commitment  to Israel’s
security: “The EU remains unequivocally committed to the security of Israel, including
with regard to vital  threats in the region.  We condemn all  forms of violence against
civilians,  including  rocket  attacks  from  Gaza."22 Furthermore,  the  EU  relatively
moderated its criticism of Israeli operation Defense Pillar on November 2012 stressing
Israel’s  right to protect its  population from the rockets fired by the Hamas.  The EU,
however, urged Israel ”to ensure that its response is proportionate“.23 
14 Another point of divergence relates to the EU often pronounced demand from Israel to
remove its blockade on the Gaza strip claiming that it violates international law. Israel
regards the blockade on Gaza as a top security issue intended to prevent Hamas intensive
smuggling  of  weapons.  Israel  argues  that  the  Gaza  blockade  is  compatible  with
international law, since Israel enables a constant supply of goods to the civil population,
except for war materials.24
15 The emerging reconciliation between the Palestinian authority and the Hamas in Gaza
has  created  a  new  European-Israeli  bone  of  contention.  Thus,  the  EU,  which  has
underlined on numerous occasions in the past that such reconciliation would constitute
an  important  contribution  to  the  Palestinian  state  building,  has  welcomed  the
reconciliation on condition that the Hamas adheres to three requirements: recognition of
Israel’s right to exist, renouncing terror and abiding by the agreements signed between
Israel and the Palestinian authority.25
16 The EU also urged for the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian talks despite the PA-
Hamas reconciliation deal.  Israel,  in contrast  to  the EU,  regards this  deal  as  a  game
changer, stressing that amid the talks with Israel, Abu-Mazen has reached an agreement
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17 The revolutionary events in Egypt, resulting in the ousting of President Husni Mubarak in
February 2011 triggered the election of Muhamed Mursi as the President of Egypt on June
2012. Morsi was toppled in a military “coup d’Etat” following mass manifestations as a
result of Egyptian public resentment regarding Mursi’s endeavors to impose an Islamic
constitution as well as regarding the deteriorating economy and security in Egypt. Both
Israel  and the  EU are  concerned about  the  tumultuous  events  in  Egypt.  The  EU,  on
numerous  occasions,  has  expressed  its  concerns  regarding  the  turmoil  which  might
jeopardize the establishment of a democratic regime in Egypt.27 
18 In Israel, concerns focus mainly on the ominous repercussions of the Egyptian upheaval
on its immediate security. Thus, the weakening of the Egyptian grip over Sinai led to the
strengthening of the extremist Muslim groups there. In fact, before the toppling of Morsi,
Hamas has profited of the turmoil in Egypt as well as the favorable attitudes of Mohamed
Morsi’s  Muslim Brotherhood government  in  order  to  smuggle  weapons,  missiles  and
other commodities through tunnels in the Sinai to the Gaza strip. The Hamas’ activists
have also benefited of the jihadist infrastructure in Sinai to carry out missile attacks
against Israel as for example the rocket attack on Eilat on April 17, 2013. Indeed, the
ousting of Morsi, the closing of numerous smuggling tunnels and the crackdown of the
Sissi  regime on the  Islamists  in  Sinai  have  weakened the  Hamas.  However,  Israel  is
currently concerned that the Hamas, being pushed into the corner,  might resume its
terror attacks on Israel.28 These concerns seem to become more tangible with the recent
missiles attacks against Israeli territory as well as the exposure of the three Hamas terror
tunnels in Israeli territory during 2013 as well as on March 2014.29 
 
Syria
19 A major security concern to both Israel and the EU resides in the escalation of the civil
war in Syria and its enormous humanitarian crisis.  In addition, the situation in Syria
constitutes a common concern to Israel as well as to the EU due the involvement of Al
Qaida affiliated terrorist groups in the civil war.30 Furthermore, both Israel and the EU are
concerned  by  the  possible  spillover  of  the  crisis  into  bordering  countries  (Jordan,
Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Israel) since it risks to turn the crisis into a regional or even
global conflict, mainly as result of the military involvement of Hezbollah and Iran in the
conflict. The EU is equally concerned by the spillover of the Syrian conflict into the EU
member states as evident from the phenomena of western youngsters joining the ranges
of Al-Qaeda affiliated rebels in Syria.31
20 Despite the shared security concerns, Israel and the EU have shaped different perceptions
and positions regarding the Syrian civil war. The EU, in contrast to Israel has overtly
expressed its support for the Syrian opposition. Following the violent repression of the
anti government protests the EU imposed an embargo on arms and oil exports to and
from Syria. Additionally, the EU has suspended its association agreement with Syria.32 The
EU has also provided humanitarian, economic and diplomatic support to the opposition.
On November 2012 The EU has even recognized the National Coalition as the “legitimate
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representatives of the aspirations of the Syrian people”.33 At the same time, however, the
EU has firmly opposed any military intervention such as imposing a no-fly zone without
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. 
21 On May 2013 the issue of renewing the arms embargo on Syria seriously divided the EU.
France and Britain have tried in vain to convince the other EU member states to lift the
arms embargo and deliver weapons to the opposition with the purpose of ending the
stalemate. They have claimed that this should be done with caution in order to prevent
arms from falling into the hands of Al-Qaeda affiliated factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra.34
22 A slight  hardening in the tone of  the EU occurred on August 21,  2013 following the
murderous chemical attacks of the Assad regime against its citizens. The EU called on the
UN Security Council to intervene against the Assad regime. It opposed, however, French
declared willingness to join the US in a military intervention against the Assad regime.
Subsequently, the EU embraced the Russian diplomatic intervention which led to Assad’s
formal  agreement  to  give  up  his  chemical  arsenal  despite  the  vagueness  of  its  full
implementation.35 
23 Israel’s reaction to the Syrian crisis is different from that of the EU. Since the outbreak of
the Syrian civil war, Israel has declared that it did not intend to intervene on behalf of
one of the sides in Syria. Israel has stressed, however, that it would intervene only to stop
the  shipments  of  Iranian  game  changing  advanced  arms  to  Hezbollah.  In  fact,  the
smuggling of arms to Hezbollah,  which is forbidden by UNSC decision 1701 (2006),  is
considered  as  an  immense  threat  to  Israel’s  security.  That  was  the  reason  behind
Israel’s air raids against Syrians convoys of  missiles designated to be delivered to the
Hezbollah. In view of Syrian threats over Israel’s air strike and the incidents of spillover
of the Syrian civil  war into Israeli  territory,  Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has
clarified:  ”Israel  won’t  intervene in  Syria  if  not  targeted“.36 Defense  Minister  Yaalon
reacted similarly on the lethal mass killing of Syrians by chemical arms and US declared
intention  to  militarily  intervene  in  Syria:  ”We  aren’t  getting  involved  in  what  is
happening in Syria… we aren’t supporting or involved in a possible strike“.37 It is to be
noted that  the EU in its  reaction to  the Israeli  strike  in Syria  has  not  revealed any
understanding for the Israeli concerns regarding the transfer of advanced missiles to the
Hezbollah.  Thus,  Ashton’s  spokesman,  Michael  Mann  expressed  the  EU  formal
disapproval  for  the  Israeli  strike:  “We are  looking with  great  concern at  the  recent
developments in and around Syria that risk dragging the region into an increasingly
violent and expanding conflict”.38
 
Lebanon and Hezbollah
24 The spillover of the Syrian civil war into Lebanon created a common point of concern to
the EU and to Israel. The participation of Hezbollah in the war on the side of Assad in the
repression of the opposition forces has created a rift within the ranges of Hezbollah itself
as well as among its Shiites supporters.39 Hezbollah’s involvement in the war in Syria also
caused  armed clashes  between  Sunni  activists  and  the  Hezbollah.  In  view  of  these
developments  the  EU has  expressed  its  concern  over  the  prospect  of  further
destabilization of the already fragile Lebanese regime. 
25 The EU concerns for the stability of Lebanon played a major role in its past rejection of
Israeli and US demand to include the Hezbollah on its list of terror organizations. These
demands  were  strengthened following  the  publication of  the  Bulgarian  investigation
Israel-EU Security and Defense Relations in the Context of the “Arab Spring”
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 25 | 2014
6
report which ascribed to Hezbollah the bombing perpetrated in Burgas, Bulgaria in July
2012 against Israeli tourists.40
26 However, on July 2013 The EU agreed to add the Hezbollah’s military wing to the terror
list but not its political faction.41 This decision resulted of Hezbollah’s involvement in the
Syrian civil war on behalf of the Assad regime. Israel, while expressing its satisfaction
with the initiative, criticized the decision as ineffective since the political and military
factions of Hezbollah are not divided. The Hezbollah itself stated that the decision had no
significance for its activity.42
27 The divergences between Israel and the EU regarding the blacklisting of the Hezbollah
demonstrate that even in cases where both of them have common concerns, as in the case




28 Iran’s nuclear project is perceived by Israel as well as by the EU, as an issue of top security
importance. Indeed, both Israel and the EU perceive a nuclearized Iran as a major threat
to the world’s security.  The EU has even initiated several rounds of severe sanctions
aimed at influencing Iran to withdraw its support for this project.43 The Iranian growing
influence in the region, mainly through its support for Assad in Syria and Hezbollah in
Lebanon, constitute another common concern of the EU and Israel. However, Israel and
the EU have opposing stances concerning the use of military force as a last resort in case
of the failure of the diplomatic and economic measures to stop the project. This different
perception  was  well  evident  in  their  attitudes  towards  the  “charm  offensive”  of
Rouhani’s,  the newly elected Iranian President.  Thus,  while the EU has expressed its
determination to seek diplomatic solution, Israel has persisted in presenting its skeptical
attitudes,  claiming that  Iran was  clearly  striving to  gain time in  order  to  reach the
irreversible point.44 The EU-Israel divergence has increased due to the expressions of
willingness within the EU member states to ease the sanctions on Iran, as expressed by
high level British and French delegates visiting Israel on October 2013.45 Israel’s Prime
Minister  Binyamin Netanyahu,  manifesting skeptical  attitudes regarding the Iranians’
intentions, and taking seriously Iran’s threats regarding Israel, urged France and Britain
not to ease the sanctions until Iran abandons its nuclear project.46 During the Geneva
talks between the Iranians and P5+1 powers (the United States, France, Britain, Germany,
Russia and China) coordinated by Catherine Ashton , the EU manifested its inclination to
sign a deal with the Iranians which was severely criticized by Israel. A last minute French
hard line, demanding the full suspension of the activity at the heavy water reactor in
Arak, the downgrading of its stockpile of enriched uranium from 20 percent to 5 percent,
and not recognizing Iran’s right to enrich uranium, temporarily blocked the agreement
with Iran.47 However, on October 24, an interim deal was signed between the six powers
and Iran, easing the sanctions on Iran in return for Iran’s partial agreement to restrict its
nuclear program and put it under international inspection. The EU foreign policy chief
Catherine  Ashton,  praised  the  deal  for  creating  time  and  space  “for  talks  aimed  at
reaching a comprehensive solution to the dispute”.48 Israel, however, has denounced the
deal as a victory to the Iranians, since they obtained the easing of the sanctions without
giving any commitment regarding the dismantlement of their nuclear capabilities.49
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Israel-EU Defense Cooperation
29 Despite the numerous political  and security divergences presented thus far,  common
perceptions of threats such as the Iranian nuclear program, the upheaval in the Arab
world and mainly the bloodshed in Syria, the increase in the number of radical Islamic
groups,  international  terror,  the  cyber  war  and so  forth,  have  fostered  defense  and
security cooperation mainly on the bilateral level with the EU member states. Defense
and security cooperation between Israel and the EU is more limited, inter alia, since the
EU as a whole has not yet succeeded to formulate and implement a significant common
defense policy.50
30 One aspect  of  defense  and security  cooperation is  displayed in  the  regular  strategic
dialogues between Israel and the EU member states such as France, Britain and Germany.
This  kind of  strategic  dialogues  involve  the  exchange of  intelligence assessments  on
central geo-strategic international and regional issues.51 
31 In 2008, the EU decided to upgrade its relations with Israel within the European Common
Foreign and Security Policy-CFSP and also to organize a diplomatic-strategic dialogue
between Israel and the EU.52 Indeed, according to Israeli Foreign office statements, Israel
joined the EU’s Research and Development-R&D program and has gained more access to
political and defense policy committees.53 In September 2010, Israel and the EU held a
dialogue  on  weapons  control  and  non-proliferation  of  weapons of  mass  destruction
(WMD).54 The EU has tried to initiate an international conference on WMD designed to
take place in 2013. It has stressed the urgency in creating a Middle East free of WMD in
view of the upheaval in the region. However, following the Arab states proposal of a
resolution at  a  UN nuclear  agency in Vienna,  which has  intended to  criticize  Israeli
“nuclear capabilities”, Israel refused to participate in the conference. The US joined Israel
in its criticism about the Arab tendency to single Israel out.55 
32 Other visible aspects of Israeli-EU security and defense relations are displayed in mutual
visits of high ranking personalities56 and through joint military training exercises such as
the joint Israeli-Italian, Israeli-Greek Israeli-Polish and Israeli-Italian air force exercises
in the years 2010 to 2013.57 There were also common drills with other European state
within the framework of NATO’s military drills.58
33 Additionally,  Israel  and EU member states regularly implement numerous arms deals
despite the controversy that such deals occasionally stir up in the EU public opinion. For
instance, France, Germany and other EU states have purchased drones from Israel since
the  1990’s,  as  Israeli  drones  have  won  a  world-wide  reputation  for  their  advanced
technology. The procurement of drones from Israel is motivated by military necessity, as
European states only took notice of the value of drones in modern warfare long after
Israel had drawn this conclusion. Consequently, many of the EU states have reached the
decision  that  buying  Israeli  drones  would  be  less  costly  and  would  provide  a  more
promising outcome than developing them. Additional attractive factors of Israeli drones
relate to Israel’s practical field experience while operating drones as an effective weapon
in the asymmetric battle against terrorists. Another significant attractive factor relates to
Israel’s willingness to sell the drones with their technology, in contrast to the US which
sells military products “off the shelf” without their technologies. However, along with the
procurement of Israeli drones, EU members such as France, Britain Germany, Spain, and
Italy have launched research and development projects of a European Unmanned Aerial
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Vehicle-UAV,  which  up  to  now  have  not  shown  the  desired  results.  Alongside  the
pragmatic military considerations which push the EU members to buy Israeli drones as
well as other military products such as advanced missiles, there are political pressures to
withhold  arms  deals  with  Israel.  For  instance,  the  newly  elected  Socialist  French
government  has  decided  to  suspend  the  former  administration’s  decision  to  buy
advanced “Heron TP” drones from Israel. However this annulment, that was made due to
variety of considerations, is seemingly not yet final.59
34 Within Israeli’s arms deals with the EU member states it is important to point out the six
submarines deals with Germany which have a major strategic value to Israel. Three of the
submarines were already provided, two other are expected during 2014 and the third in
2018.60
35 It is estimated that the EU’s potential of further deepening its Common Security and
Defense  Policy  (CSDP)  might  also  affect  Israeli-EU defense  and  security  cooperation.
Seemingly the defense and security cooperation is relatively easier within the bilateral
relations with the EU member states than within the framework of the EU. Thus, as result
of the desire to display unity through unanimous votes, some member states which may
have  decided  to  negotiate  arms  transactions  with  an  Israeli  company,  might  find
themselves under EU pressure to forgo these deals. However, it is also possible that the
prevailing diversity among the EU member states would continue to be a dominant factor
in  the  shaping  of  Israel-EU  defense  and  security  cooperation.  Another  option  of
circumventing anti-Israeli political pressure is via the relatively widespread practice of
creating partnerships between Israeli companies and local EU companies. For instance,
“UTac LTD”, Israeli Elbit’s subsidiary company, is cooperating with “Thales Britain” in a
joint project of The British “Watchkeeper” drones project based on Elbit’s “Hermes 450”. 
36 Another distinctive area of  cooperation relates to cooperation in space.  For instance,
already in 1994 Israel and France signed a cooperation agreement in space projects. In the
following years they cooperated inter alia in joint projects such as the satellites Amos
(1-4) and Venus. Israel and the EU have also cooperated in the framework of the European
Space Agency in projects such as Galileo. This cooperation became possible despite the
impediments  presented  above  due  to  the  mutual  appreciation  for  the  advanced
technologic  and  scientific  capabilities  competence  of  Israel  and  especially  Israel’s
remarkable  accomplishments  in  miniaturized  space  technologies.  In  addition,  the
enormous  budgets  required  for  accomplishing  the  space  projects  favor  interstate
cooperation. The civil scientific aspect of the activity in space (although the civil and the
military capacities are interconnected) has probably neutralized the widespread hostile
attitudes within public opinion towards military cooperation with Israel. 
 
Conclusion
37 The present article has underlined the duality in Israel-EU defense and security relations.
On  one  hand  there  are  substantial  conceptual  political-strategic  differences  on  the
backdrop of the “Arab Spring”, particularly regarding the Arab-Israeli  conflict,  which
produce  crises  between Israel  and the  EU.  On the  other  hand,  there  is  defense  and
security dialogue, in particular between the EU member states and Israel, in view of the
growing shared security challenges relating to the upheaval in the Arab world, Iran’s
nuclear threat, the global terrorism, the cyber war as well as the global economic crisis. 
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38 In fact, the shared Israel-EU concerns have not necessarily produced common policies.
The EU, occasionally, tends to minimize Israel’s genuine security and defense concerns
resulting of  Israeli  explosive and volatile  geostrategic  environment  and the concrete
threats against its very existence. On the other hand the EU appreciates the Israeli stable
democracy (the only one in the region),  its High-Tech industry,  its advanced defense
industry and its experience in the asymmetric warfare. 
39 Finally, the defense and security cooperation, between Israel and the EU, though often
discreet  is  significant  since  it  also  promotes  channels  of  political  dialogue  and
cooperation which are indispensable in view of the current upheaval in the Middle East. 
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This  article  focuses  on  Israel-EU security  and  defense  relations  in  the  context  of  the  “Arab
Spring”. It displays the divergences and convergences over issues related to the “Arab Spring”
such as the Israeli Palestinian conflict, the Hamas, Egypt's revolutionary events, the Syrian Civil
war, Lebanon and Hezbollah and the Iranian nuclear project. It goes on to briefly highlight some
main areas of defense and security cooperation which are more significant on the bilateral level
between Israel and the EU member states than with the EU itself. The article emphasizes the
shared strategic concerns of Israel and the EU as the major motivations behind the cooperation.
It  concludes  with  a  message  regarding  the  imperative  of  further  political  and  strategic
cooperation between Israel and the EU in view of a volatile and explosive geostrategic Middle
East. 
Cette étude porte sur les relations de défense et de sécurité entre Israël et l'Union Européenne
(UE) en vue des événements du « Printemps Arabe ». Il décrit les convergences et les divergences
sur les questions liées au « Printemps Arabe », comme le conflit israélo-palestinien, le Hamas, les
événements révolutionnaires en Égypte, la guerre civile syrienne, le Liban, le Hezbollah et le
projet nucléaire iranien. Il met ensuite en lumière les principaux domaines de la coopération de
défense et de sécurité qui sont en effet plus importants sur le plan bilatéral entre Israël et les
États  membres  de  l'UE  qu'avec  l'UE  elle-même.  L'article  souligne  les  préoccupations  et  les
intérêts  stratégiques  communs  d'Israël  et  de  l'UE  qui  rendent  la  coopération  politique  et
sécuritaire indispensable en vue d'un Moyen-Orient extrêmement instable et explosif. 
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